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Abstract
Preserving privacy dllring Web transactiollS is a major
coneen/for individuals und organizatiolls. aile of tile solutiollS proposed;1I the literature/or preserving privacy is by
adopting a system that helps ill 1I10;1II0;n;1I8 anonymity
throllg!1 group cooperatioll during Web tral/saetiolls. The
lack of /lllderstalldi,lg of illcemives for encouraging group
cooperation is a major drawback ;/1 adopting such systems.
We propose all allollymizill8 club mechanism, alld sequential ecollomic strategy for trllsted collaboratioll. We model
the i/ldivid/lal tral/sactiol/s as a Prisol/ers' Dilemma. where
two players eit/ler cooperate or defect while mail/taining
each other's anonymity. The activities of the parricipallts
over a series of transactions call be modeled as a seqllential repeated game. We detenlline conditions to ensure cooperation amollg the parricipums in the seqllelltial repeared game, evell if defecting is a dominant strategy ill
each individual Prisoners' Dilemma game. Gur results
show tllat by adopting an appropriate initiation fee alld
adequate fiue for malicio/ls bel/avior. both enforced
through a tn/sted celltral authority, we can Sltsraill cooperation in rhe proposed allonYlllizing club mechallism.

Keywords: Anonymily, privacy, Web services, economic
incentives, Prisoners' Dilemma, sequential repeated game.
1. INTRODUCTION
Anonymizing Web services provide a solution for preserving privacy on the Web. Many intennediaries have come
forward to provide such a service to the potential custom·
ers. This scenario is described in a W3C working draft [1]:
A developer wishes to force an explicit message
path through certain intennediaries - for instance, he
might use an anonymizing intennediary to make a
call lo a specified remole service without allowing
the target service to track the identity/IF of the
caller. In this case, the intennediary is responsible
for calling the target service and returning the results
to the caller, using its own authentication credentials
if any are required by the target service.

With so much concern for pri vacy preservation by individuals and organizalions. such services are supposed to
sell like hot cakes. On the contrary, wilh a notable exception [14], no such commercial services have been able to
succeed. Besides technical factors, many social and economic reasons contribule to the difficullies in maintaining
an anonymizing infrastructure [5][6].
Anonymity cannot be created by single interested individuals or organizations themselves. It requires participation
from other Web nodes owned by other entilies. The more
nodes participate in mixing of the traffic, the bigger is the
noise and the beUer is anonymity. Establishing and maintaining bUst among a large number of nodes is the major
bottleneck in sustaining such a framework. Each node in
this framework is dependent on the other nodes for protecting its privacy. Adoption of an appropriate economic incentive scheme could be one of the solutions for managing
distributed trust in this framework.
The single hop proxies (like Anonymizer [14]) can protect
the end user from simple threats like profile-creating Web
siles, but they cannot hide from the adversaries the traffic
going through their siles. Analysis of incoming traffic can
provide valuable infonnation about the users of the intermediary proxies. Moreover, the user has to trust on intermediary for preserving his anonymity. So. this kind of anonymity infrastructure does not attract many privacyconcerned users or organizations.
Since traffic analysis is a major threal for maintaining anonymity, an anollymizing club mec!lallism - in which many
nodes cooperate lo maintain anonymity - emerges as an
interesting alternative {9]. However, the failure of a commercial solulion - Freedom Networks initialed by Zero
Knowledge Systems [3J - may raise a question about the
viability of such a scenario. The designers of lhis network
admit {4] that the network failed because the company
could nOl sell its services to a sufficient number of clients to

• TIlls research was supported in pari by NSF Grants IIS-0209059 and lIS-0242840

cover its costs. It is evident that inadequate economic analysis of this service was a major contribution to its failure.
In this paper we propose an economic scheme, using a
game theoretic model, that can be used in a centrally controlled club mechanism to maintain trust amongst the nodes
in sequential repeated transactions. The proposed club
mechanism although centrally controlled, is more decentralized than in Freedom Network, where central aulilOrity collects all the fees and redistributes them to the node operators. The proposed scheme requircs the participants to submit to the central authority only a one-time initiation fee
and pay to it fines for misbehavior. We assume that any two
nodes get equal benefits by using each others anonymizing
services and thus need not be additionally paid. Our idea is
analogous to the use of trusted third parties for trust building in online auction markets [12].

2.

Using some matching strategy [8J, the central authority brings two members together to be partners for an anonymizing Web transaction during
the time period tl . We assume that no cost is involved in running this matching algorithm.

3.

During the OIlOlIymizil/g transactioll two members receive a benefit P, each by maintaining
anonymity and using each other's service.

4.

During the transaction each partner has two
strategies: cooperate or defect. So, each stage
represents a Prisoners' Dilemma (explained in the
following section).

5.

If Alice feels that Bob cheats her, she reports it to
the central authority claiming a loss Pc/aim suffered by her due to violation of her privacy.

6.

The central authority investigates the fraud and
both parties are asked to show the evidence to
prove themselves innocent.

2. THE PROPOSED CLUB MECHANISM WITH

SEQUENTIAL STRATEGY
We model individual transactions between any two nodes
as a Prisoners' Dilemma game [13], where an individual
player has an incentive to cheat. More precisely, each
player is afraid of being cheated, and to maximize her benefit tries to cheat herself. Cheating emerges as the most rational alternative for each single interaction. However,
when this game is played sequentially in a repeated manner,
each player tries to max.imize her average payoff for the
whole sequence. We derive the conditions under which
cooperation and not defection (cheating) becomes the
dominant strategy of a player in the sequential game.

If fraud is confirmed, Bob pays a fine f and PrI"im,
Alice gets compensation P daim and the central authority gets fine f Otherwise, Alice is charged
with a false complaint and pays fine g to the central authority.

7.

2.1 Prisoner's Dilemma Played at Each Stage
Let P, be the benefit from privacy protecrioll received by an
agent within timc period r. Therefore, it is justified to treat
-P, as the cost of privacy violation if it is suffered by an
agent during thal period. Lett, be the bellefit from disclosillg ti,e privacy ofallotl,er agent within time period t.

Since it is much more expensive to maintain decentralized
trust, we include a celltral allthorjty whom all the parties
must trust. This central authority could be an outside trusted
third party, or one of the club members who volunteers or
nominated to perfonn this task. The central authority randomly matches any two club members for an anonymizing
transaction. An anonymizing transaction involves two regulae transactions, one from each member of the pair matched
by the central authorily. The central authority also can resolve conflicts between any two nodes.

We assume here that both partners have symmetric privacy
needs. That is, all the parties have equal costs and benefits
associated with anonymous transactions. They also have
equal number ofrequests for anonymizing. We also assume
that the benefit from privacy protection is higher than the
benefits received by sacrificing the partner's privacy (i.e. P,
> I,). We assume that P,'s are independently identically distributed random variables with a common distribution P.
We define P"""" as a value beyond which distribution P has
no positive probability density, that is, we use the value
Pmru: as an estimate of the maximum possible benefit rcceived by a cooperating agent. E(P) is the expectation of P.

We call the proposed mechanism an Qllollymity ell/b, since
a group of nodes come together with a promise to provide
each others anonymity. We call each club member an agel/t.
We propose a sequential strategy analogous to [12]. We
assume that each agent is rational and will try to maximize
his payoff in the sequential game.

We hold a similar assumption for the random variable [,.
We also define fmm: as an estimate of the maximum possible
benefit received by a defecting agent.

The proposed sequential strategy relies on the following
rules:

I.

The culprit who does not pay a fine or a compensation is expelled from the club.

An individual or an organization becomes a club
member by paying a one time initiation fee F to
the central authority.

I

2

We use r and not ill for time period for convenience.

At each stage each agenl has two choices: eilher 10 defect
(D) or to cooperate (C). If agents cooperate with each other,
then both are going 10 receive a benefit P, resulting from
privacy protection. If one of the agents defects and the other
cooperates, then the cooperating agent's privacy is violated
and she suffers a loss of -P,. On the other hand, the defector's privacy is preserved and he receives a benefit 1, that
increases his total benefits to PI + I, during the time period
t. If both defect then neither of the agents' privacy is preserved, so each bears a loss of .p, but receives a benefil of
I,. The resulting payoff malrix from this game is shown in
Figure I.

where V is the tolal (lifetime) payoff, and v, is the payoff
stream for time period t, where r::=1,2, .... Using the fonnula
for the sum of (he geometric series we get from this:
v~(I-O)V

Since the payoff slream for all time periods has a constant
time-weighted average payoff, maximizing V is equivalent
to maximizing v. In other words, if the agent maximizes his
time-weighted average payoff, he will also maximize his
total payoff (i.e. his lifetime payoff). This will provide him
incentive for cooperation (not cheating) in that period even
though defection is lhe dominant strategy at each stage, as
described in the discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma
game.

Even lhough cooperation maXlffilzes the lotal payoff for
both players taken together, lhe fear of cheating by lhe
partner induces defeclion behavior by any of the parlners at
an individual stage. So, the only Nash equilibrium for both
players in this game is to defect. That is, the payoff of any
agent who deviates from the equilibrium strategy reduces.

c

3. ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
FOR ENABLING THE CLUB MECHANISM
We now can discuss the condilions under which the agents
will cooperate in a repeated sequential game, even though
each non-repealed game results in defection as the equilibrium slrategy.

D

c

P, ,P,

-P" P, + 1,

D

P, +l,,-P,

-P, +1" -P, +1,

In our propositions and proof, while evaluating total payoff
sometimes we have 10 consider the payoff from lhe current
transaction at time period to separately from payoff from
future periods starting from (I. It is necessary because conditions like giving initiation fee or paying the fine for the
malicious behavior occur only in the current time period (0.

Figure 1. Payoff structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma game

The total payoff starting from period to is:

<'",

~

E(P)

E[Po+P,u+P1u +PJu + .... ]=0 1-0

2.2 An Agent's Time-Weighted Average Payoff
We have 10 consider an infinite repeated game for which we
need to evaluate the time-weighted average payoff of an
agent.

whereas, when starting from

tj,

it is:

0
0
E [ P, +Pl
+P, 8' +.... ]=0 OE(P)
1-0
2

where P; is lhe payoff in the time period
The value of lhe fulure earning expressed in today's currency is smaller (e.g with interest rate i=5% per annum,
$105 next year is equivalent 10 $100 this year). Consequently, all future earnings must be discounted. We use 6

tj.

Propositioll I: An agent will join the proposed anonymizing
club if the initiation fee (given al time period to) is less than
the difference belween his total fulure payoff from this service (starting from time period tl) and the maximum fulure
payoff from adopting any other privacy preserving technology, i.e. if the following inequality is satisfied:

I

as the discOllllr factor, 0 < 8 < 1. It is defined as 8 = - - ,
l+i
where, i is the interesl rate.

F<

We can define an agent's time-weighted average payoff
v over a sequence of transactions [2][12] using the following relationship:

c5E(P)-a

1-0

.

where a is the maximum of all expected payoffs from any
other privacy·preserving technology available at thal lime
period.

v ~ Io'v,
~ Io'v
,·0
,_0

Proof If the agent joins the club, he contributes F 10 lhe
club fund at time period (0 and receives benefits from time
period (I onwards making the total payoff

3

Hence:
1_ < E(P)_p
1-0
-

o

So, the time-weighted average payoff of the agent is:

v=

-(1- 0)F + (I-O)E{P,o

This result has an interesting interpretation. If an agent considers his expected benefit E(P) from the proposed service
to be very high, then it provides him a very high incentive
for cooperation.

+ P~o~ + PJ 0 +.... J
3

As t ---) 00 , we get:
v = -(I-b)F + JE(P)

Propositioll 3: A defector who is proven guilty is willing to
pay the fine if it is lower than the difference between his
total future payoff (starting from tl) and the compensation
claimed by his partner, i.e. if the following condition is sat·
isfied:

An agent will join the club if his lifetime average payoff is
greater than the maximum of all expected payoffs, a, from
any other alternative privacy-preserving mechanisms available at that time period, that is, if:

JE(P)

f < (I-a)

-(1-b)F+JE(P»a

-

P
"..m

Hence, we gel:
Proof If a defector does not pay the fine, his club membership will be revoked, and he can no more avail the service.
Thus, his payoff will be 0 in all future tmnsactions. His
present payoff will be (P,+l,) (from Figure 1). If his total
payoff from not paying the fine exceeds his payoff from
paying the fine, then he will prefer not to pay. Consequently
the condition for paying the fine (starting from current time
period 10) is that the total payoff after paying the fine exceeds tolal payoff after not paying the fine, that is:

F<OE(P)-a
1-0
Interestingly, since the average payoff from the alternative
service is a, the tOlal payoff starting from time period to
~
a
from that service turns out to be LJ a' a = - - .

,.0

1-0

D

Proposirioll 2: An agent will cooperate at every stage in the
sequential repeated game if the maximum value of the benefit from the cheating behavior is less than the total future
payoff (from to) minus the maximum payoff achievable in
the current transaction, i.e. if the following condition is
satisfied:

(I-O)(Po +lo - f - p....m ) +(1-a)E[p,a + p~al + PJo l +....]
> (l-O)(Po +l,)+O
Equivalently:
(1- b)(P. + I.) - (1- 0)([ + P,_) + JE(P) > (1- o)(P. +1.)

1 <E(P)_p
1-0
-

Hence:

f
Proof: If an agent at certain stage defects, is found guilty,
and does not pay the fine, his club membership will be revoked. Therefore, although his present payoff is (P,+l,)
(from Figure I) his future payoff will be 0 for not availing
the service. So, a rational agent will prefer to cooperate
starting at time period fO if his total payoff from cooperating
exceeds his total payoff from defecting, that is, if:

JE(P)

< (1-0) -

P
d .. m

D

Propositiol/ 4: If a player's complaimmt is proven false, he
is willing to pay the fine imposed on him if it is lower than
his total future payoff (starting from 11), i.e. if the following
condition is satisfied:
JE(P)
g<(1-b)
Proof Arguing in the similar manner as above, we can justify that the condition for paying fine by a false complainanl
is that the total payoff with paying the fine exceeds total
payoff after not paying the fine, Le.:

Hence, we get:

Considering the upper bounds for P and 1, the condition
becomes:
Hence:

4

JE(P)
8<(1-0)

ploying the service, and the dynamic cost for maintaining
the service. Lack of analysis of economic incentive mechanisms is seen as a primary factor in the failures of anonymity infrastructures [4].

IJ

Theorem: The proposed sequential strategy is an equilibrium strategy if the fine is imposed following conditions in
Propositions 3 and 4. i.e.• if:
JE(P)
f <---P

(1-0)

Acquisti et al. L9] built the foundation for an economic
study of the viability of an anonymity infrastructure. They
propose a model where messages are passed through an
anonymizing mix-net. The model distinguishes between
honest and dishonest nodes and captures the costs and benefits of anonymous transactions. Though they argue on the
importance of a decentralized anonymity infrastructure,
they admit the difficulty of providing such a structure due to
the coordination problems. They suggest establishing a central coordination authority to redistribute the payments. Our
strategy takes the issue further by partially decentralizing
the payment structure, so the central authority is not involved in payments for individual transactions. It deals with
the membership fees and fines only.

""'

ond

oE(P)

g<-(1-0)

The average payoff for an agent in this strategy is:

v = JE(P) - (1- 0)F .
Proof Based on Propositions 3 and 4, if the above two
conditions are satisfied at each lime period rj. then - based
on the optimality principle of dynamic programming [15] we know thaI one time deviation from the proposed strategy
will not be profilable for any raLiana! agent. So, the agents
will cooperate and will receive an average payoff
OE(P) - (1- oW (following the arguments of the proof of

Proposition 1).

Another example of maintaining cooperation using an economic incentive mechanisms are peer-to-peer networks
[10]. The trust can be maintained in such systems through
the use of shared and private histories of the transactions.
Also in this case the difficulty of devising decentralized
mechanisms (for example, sharing the privllle history) is
admitted.

U

4. RELATED WORK

5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In a sequential game each player is assumed 10 be sequentially rational. Every decision in the sequential game must
be a part of an optimal strategy for the remainder of the
game. So, unlike the equilibrium in a non-sequential game
where each player has a single strategy. a sequential equilibrium emphasizes formation of a player's belief about the
other player at each stage of the game [7].

The paper proposes the idea of an anonymizing club Web
service, a rational sequential strategy, and determines the
conditions for cooperation amongst the participants of this
anonymizing Web service. The strategy assumes the presence of a trusted third party for information dissemination
and for sustaining cooperation. The strategy is simple and
independent of any underlying architecture. It may be
adopted and suitably modified for any framework.

Economics community has emphasized adopting extra legal
mechanisms. like community enforcement by maintaining
social norms [8]. The concept of community enforcemem
emphasizes that when the agents change their partners over
the time. the dishonest Bob's behavior against Alice causes
sancLions against Bob not only by Alice but also by other
members of the society. These sanctions can be regarded as
the enforcement of social norms. Such norms can be hard to
maintain if no effective mechanism for information dissemination or enforcement of honest behavior is adopted. In
this paper we use the central authority to disseminate information and enforce honest behavior. Similar approach
has been used by Ba et af. [12J to build trust in the online
auction markets.

The proposed strlllegy can be improved in many ways.:

Different anonymizing services adopt different types of
infrastructure for providing anonymity to its users [9].
Every type of infrastructure has inherent cosLs and benefits
associated with it. The costs include the fixed costs for de-

5

1.

The central authority may not give fair judgment every
time. The judgment may be biased towards a particular
agent. So the consideration of agent's belief in the fairness of the central authority could improve the model.

2.

Consideration of the fixed costs associated with starting the service would make the strategy more realistic.

3.

It may be required to define the minimum number of
participants staning a club so that their initiation fees
cover the necessary fixed cost. This will make the implementation more realistic.

4.

Our assumption of no cost involved in running the
matching algorithm is also quite strong. To accommodate this cost, another variable cosl, such as annual
club membership, may be included.

5.

The probabilistic modeling of cheating behavior of
individual agents could also improve the strategy.

6.

We assume that differenL agents, who come togelher Lo
form a club, have equal privacy concerns. Therefore.
all the parties have equal costs and benefits associated
with anonymizing transaclions. The effect of the Prisoners' Dilemma game may be substantially different if
the parties have unequal benefits from utilizing the service. This issue may be investigated.
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